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Chapter 6
Trusted Computing: Opportunities  
in Software
The pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every 
difficulty.
—Winston Churchill
Previous chapters have provided some greater insights into the opportunities for implementing, managing, and 
expanding the value of platform trust as the software and security ecosystem embraces this technology. This chapter 
will review the critical roles that software and services providers will play to make trust pervasive, scalable, and 
increasingly useful for businesses of all sizes.
What Does “Enablement” Really Mean?
This book has discussed the enablement of Intel TXT in many different dimensions. It is now a good opportunity to 
take a look at the impact of trusted computing approaches on the system and software environment and to detail what 
changes are required to make trust a usable and valuable component of an organization’s security arsenal.
Let’s start by taking a look at the various layers of enabled use models and how the solutions ecosystem has and 
will continue to evolve their products to provide higher levels of integrity assurance and trust. Because the use models 
for trust can be quite extensive and can build from a rudimentary trusted platform to more complex and far-reaching 
use models, the solution stacks can get somewhat large and perhaps look a bit daunting; we often discuss them in 
terms of a layered pyramid model, as shown in Figure 6-1.
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As shown in Figure 6-1, there can be quite a bit of enabling required for building full solutions. The functionality 
for Intel TXT can have impact that spans the hardware and firmware of the server platform, the virtualization layer, 
or hypervisor (and as noted in previous chapters, bare-metal operating systems in nonvirtualized uses), as well 
as into the virtualization management and security policy layers, and even into the specialized security incident 
management and analysis tools (SIEM) and governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) tools domains. In this chapter, 
we will take a more detailed look at each level in this ecosystem and how they help enable the leading use models.  
We will also discuss how the various types of ecosystem components are likely to evolve through time.
Don’t let this stack intimidate you, though, or lead you to believe that there can be no business value gained 
until every layer is completely enabled. The simple fact is that not all layers are required for every solution. What gets 
implemented will generally depend on the business need and availability of enabled components. Figure 6-2 will help 
us summarize and map the key requirements for the leading use models with the capabilities and ecosystem needed 
to realize the use models.
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Figure 6-1. The trust use model ecosystem
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Figure 6-2. Steps and requirements for enabling key trust use models
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As shown, step one is the basic enablement of Intel TXT on a platform—the mechanics of which have been 
discussed through much of the early chapters of this book. This is a fundamental requirement to get any benefit 
from Intel TXT, and is core to the enablement of the trusted launch use model. The basic function for enabling 
this capability in the hardware, system BIOS, and operating system or hypervisor is to make sure the critical 
components of each server get measured during boot.
The next step is to enable attestation (as discussed in Chapter 5) to make the results of the trusted launch 
process on a given system known by some management entity. Otherwise, only the trusted platform itself 
would know that it was indeed trusted; so operationally, allowing this information to be collected is a critical 
complementary function to the trusted launch use model. The next two use models build upon these foundational 
capabilities.
The third step enables the trusted pools use model. The main principle here is that this incrementally enables 
the centrally collected trust information to be used for decision making by other software in the virtualization and 
security management tools layer in our model. This will allow new workload control capabilities, which will be 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 7.
The final step includes extending trust-based integrity reporting and workload controls into the tools of the 
general SIEM and GRC management tools layers. These can evaluate whether trusted systems and trust-based 
actions have been compliant with expectations and policies. In short, trusted platforms can become part of 
enterprise security and risk management suites through proper enablement.
Again, while not all steps or layers must be enabled by every enterprise, there are increased security and 
operational benefits to be had through having more comprehensive uses and more completely enabled layers. 
The following sections will provide a bit more detail behind the enablement of each of these layers, which should 
complement what the reader has already learned in the deployment recommendations from earlier chapters.  
As with any such structure, it is best to start the discussion at the foundation, so that is where we’ll begin.
Platform Enablement: The Basics
Logically—and perhaps obviously—an enabled server has to be a part of any trusted server solution. This book 
has discussed the inner mechanisms of how the platform can be configured for such use. But how did these 
mechanisms and tools come to being? And are all created alike? As you will see in further reading, there will be 
many common capabilities among enabled platforms in terms of protections provided, but some vendors will 
offer more differentiated solutions and user/administrator experiences that will likely deliver higher value.  
We’ll refer back to our ecosystem pyramid model in Figure 6-1 to guide our discussion as we tease this apart  
a bit more.
As shown in Figure 6-3, there are two fundamental aspects to creating an Intel TXT–enabled platform. The 
support for provisioning is discussed here first, and the remote management capabilities required for easier, broad 
scale deployments are discussed in the next section.
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These basic capabilities were covered in some depth in our earlier chapters. All systems must include these 
basic functions and features in order to be able to provide the protections and services of Intel TXT. These most basic 
required elements include:
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on the system, with a firmware mechanism for managing it.•	
A BIOS that has been enabled for trusted launch.•	
As discussed earlier, the TPM plays a critical role for sealing platform secrets and storing trust values, such as our 
known good measurements, and launch control policy indices to protect them from tampering. Many OEMs have 
been providing TPMs on a broad selection of their systems or offering them as option kits for some time now. And it is 
safe to say that they also provide a mechanism in BIOS or firmware to set up and manage the TPM on the local system.
The next requirement is a bit more recent, but also growing more pervasive. This is the requirement to have a 
BIOS that is enabled for hardware-enforced trust—that can invoke a trusted launch process and allow itself to be 
measured in the Intel TXT launch process. There is obviously a lot to that task, but in short, the critical components 
entail the following:
Integrating Intel-provided authenticated code modules (ACM) that enable and set up the •	
tamper-resistant measurement environment for the BIOS and firmware components.
Establishing the Firmware Interface Table (FIT) that provides the structure required to put the •	
platform components to be measured in predictable locations.
Putting structures into the BIOS and menu structures to allow customers to turn on the TPM •	
and Intel TXT.
These new activities are absolutely necessary for the technical enablement of Intel TXT, but in most cases 
will be largely transparent to end users or IT administrators—though some of these elements are reflected in the 
platform default (PD) policy components discussed in previous chapters. Figure 6-4 provides a screen showing 
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Figure 6-3. OEM platform enablement requirements and opportunities
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This type of menu structure is more or less representative of the IT manager experience with enabled servers—with 
few exceptions. The authors can only think of a single example in the server industry where an IT administrator will 
be required to separately install an enabling Intel TXT ACM using a discrete utility provided by the system vendor. 
An example of this process is the “Gen 8” version of many popular HP ProLiant server models. But note that this 
implementation model could certainly change in subsequent platform generations or even BIOS releases.
Despite this outlier, we have seen that most of the enabling BIOS structures will have fairly common setups. 
Some vendors will do more to add value and make it easier and more efficient for their customers to more broadly 
deploy and manage trusted servers. Much of the variability in this is rooted in how the system vendor designs and 
implements their BIOS, as well as their tools and utilities for setting up and managing their server platforms. This 
takes us into the domain of extended platform enablement, as it helps us understand how the underpinnings of trust 
can be more fully operationalized in a datacenter.
Platform Enablement: Extended
Managing trust is a critical capability. It is also rapidly becoming a fundamental requirement of the modern dynamic 
datacenter, with perhaps millions of servers on customer sites now capable of implementing Intel TXT. The primary 
challenge for actually using this capability is the limited awareness of the capability and relative burden of turning it 
on and making effective use of it. But because the capability is so foundational to some compelling use models, it is 
reasonable to expect that the ability to implement and manage trust will be an area of continued focus and innovation 
now that the broad majority of system vendors have incorporated trust technologies into their systems. As much 
as these vendors have implemented tools to deploy, detect, and manage other system attributes (examples include 
detecting or predicting component failures, deploying firmware updates, gathering asset information), trust and 
security capabilities are important aspects of systems to differentiate upon. Vendors will find that this factor is a key to 
retaining or gaining market share in the years ahead.
Figure 6-4. BIOS security setup screen of a Dell PowerEdge 720
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Attestation and attestation services•	
Reporting and logging•	
Each of these steps is vital to making trust usable in the use models described previously or as a complement to 
existing vendor technologies. And they are also critical to making trust a usable attribute on a datacenter scale. As 
such, how an OEM facilitates this may become a more significant buying criteria—guiding the selection of one vendor 
platform vs. another offering a less effective or less easy to use platform. We’ll discuss each one in turn.
Provisioning
Provisioning a single system with trust is not a terribly complex operation—though as we’ve discussed, there is some 
variation among system vendor implementations. To help solve this small challenge, Intel has published guides for 
setting up Intel TXT on many of the leading systems from leading OEMS such as HP, Dell, Cisco, IBM, and more. As 
customer interest grows, we expect that OEMs will build off these early guides to ease customer implementation pain. 
Even so, beyond that lies a bigger challenge—provisioning dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of systems in a global 
datacenter operation can take a lot of work. Typically, IT managers use multiple vendor-provided tools such as Dell 
OpenManage or HP ROM Configuration Utility (HPRCU) to set up and configure batches of servers once they have 
been “racked and stacked” or otherwise physically set up in the datacenters.
Updates
In a similar vein, IT managers use many of these same tools to manage platform updates—to push out BIOS or other 
platform firmware updates to targeted platforms in batch mode. Intel and some of the earlier adopters of trusted 
computing use models have demonstrated that these tools can effectively deploy updates to trusted platforms—using 
these tools to set up and configure Intel TXT on systems remotely and on multiple systems in a single instance. 
But here is where the server operational world and the security management world’s historical divergence create 
challenges. Specifically, there is a gap in managing server BIOS and firmware updates and maintaining an updated 
whitelist of our known good platform configurations. This applies to both the low-level PD and platform owner (PO) 
policy levels stored in the TPM, but also for consumption in higher-level enterprise security policy tools, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. Managing that gap today typically requires manual intervention, new processes, 
and likely new tools. It makes sense that, over time, traditional server management and update tools will provide 
the required hooks to automate the update of whitelists and launch control policies when new BIOS and firmware 
releases are pushed out.
Attestation
Attestation and attestation services are another area where system vendor-provided management tools would be 
a benefit. Since these tools are widely used to manage a wide array of platform attributes, having an attestation 
infrastructure that could securely verify platform trust information in the manner described in Chapter 5 would be 
a logical extension. Attestation capabilities could be used to query the platform at any time, and the results of that 
attestation effort could be used to generate logs and identify trust events such as a failed trusted launch.
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Reporting and Logging
Reporting and logging capability is the final related area where one could likely expect to see significant OEM 
innovation in the near future. As these tools are often a key resource for IT managers in understanding and reporting 
on system status and asset management, extending these tools for use in trust and security makes a lot of sense.  
For example, these tools might be used to maintain the logs of the trusted launch status, or trigger actions in the case 
of a failed trusted launch in the scenarios from the previous paragraph. Note, however, that this is an area where there 
are few practical implementations that the authors are aware of to date—even as the number of production and  
proof-of-concept deployments grows in enterprise and cloud datacenter customers.
It may be the case that security and security management applications may ultimately fill the attestation 
and reporting roles more naturally and aptly than evolved platform management utilities. One might expect that 
the balance of how much security management an organization expects of its IT generalists vs. its dedicated IT 
security professionals may be the ultimate determinant of how quickly (if at all) this role lands in traditional system 
management tools.
Another consideration is that it is likely not necessary that each of these tools integrates and contains all the 
functionalities described here. Robust APIs and open, cloud-centric architectures mean that various platform and 
application layers can share capabilities and data more broadly—using services from elsewhere in the stack to enable 
the use model at each layer.
Operating System and Hypervisor Enablement
As discussed in earlier chapters, having a bare-metal (i.e., nonvirtualized) operating system or hypervisor enabled for 
trust is key to all trust use models—one must assure that the controlling software and firmware of the platform has 
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Figure 6-5. Hypervisors and operating systems are critical components of the trusted computing stack
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In the case of Intel TXT, basic enablement means that the operating system or hypervisor can invoke the secure 
launch process. This entails two primary components—the SINIT authenticated code module and a pre-kernel 
module that can ensure that the right SINIT module is selected and assure the orderly evaluation of the launch 
components of the software.
Intel has invested years in providing enabling technology for Intel TXT, and has been maintaining the open 
source “tboot” project as the critical operating system and hypervisor–enabling component for most of that time. 
Tboot is by far the most widely used mechanism used as a foundation for software vendors to enable their OS or 
hypervisor. While SINIT modules on server platforms are generally embedded in the platform BIOS and are processor 
and chipset generation-specific, tboot components provided by Intel are integrated into the operating system or 
hypervisor by the independent software vendor (ISV) and work across multiple generations of platforms. This 
makes sense because it allows the most qualified party (in this case, the ISV) to determine which modules are the 
most essential as the Trusted Compute Base (TCB) of their software, and therefore which modules to include in the 
measured launch and in which order. These critical component measurements may also be reflected in PO and/or  
PD policy indices in the platform TPM. Tboot technology is included in multiple open-source operating  
system/hypervisor environments, from Linux to Xen/KVM, as well as a number of commercial products, such as  
Red Hat, Citrix XenServer, and more. Other vendors have implemented their own tboot-like functions to enable  
Intel TXT for trust-enabling their software solutions.
Integrating tboot (or any similar ISV-developed preboot module) is merely the most basic, essential step in 
enabling—the one that is absolutely foundational to the trusted launch use model. The other core capability that must 
be provided by the ISV in their operating system or hypervisor is the facility for taking ownership of and managing the 
TPM. This ownership of the TPM is what will allow the trusted operating environment to be able to SEAL and UNSEAL 
the TPM-holding platform secrets and to respond to attestation queries—surfacing trust results for use in our critical 
use models. How an operating system or hypervisor takes ownership of a TPM varies based on the environment—as 
will the ways someone would use to check his or her platform to determine the TPM ownership status.
Beyond allowing the trusted boot of a platform, much more functionality would be useful for making the trusted 
computing use models easily deployable in large scale datacenter and distributed cloud environments. In many ways, 
these added functions address the same types of usability and efficiency challenges we cited in the previous platform 
enablement discussion. Few of these capabilities are enabled today. While basic enabling of Intel TXT in the operating 
system and hypervisor is now broadly available, one could expect them to evolve rapidly because initial offerings are 
maturing in the commercial market and customer demand is growing. Once again, we will consider the key aspects 
with regard to how the operating system and hypervisors gain enhanced capabilities to support key trusted platforms 
use models for the following:
Provisioning•	
The update process•	
Attestation and attestation services•	
Reporting and logging•	
As discussed, datacenter customers and cloud operators typically deploy systems in bulk and at scale. 
They use imaging and remote configuration tools to enable consistent software images across scores of systems 
simultaneously. As we consider trusted platforms and trusted use models, these customer and administrators need 
tools that will allow them to configure their software environments for trusted computing in large quantities. 
 This is certainly feasible today, with better operational results (for example fewer steps, less scripting, etc.) in some 
environments than others. Generally speaking, environments that detect and enable platform trust by default  
(such as VMware vSphere) will make the practice simpler than those that require more customization and 
configuration of boot files and the like.
A related area that will require far more work is the update and upgrade process. Here again, the main culprit is the 
immaturity of solutions, resulting in an operational gap—wherein there is a lack of integration in the trust management 
(for example, maintaining the whitelist of known good versions of the software) and the software image deployment 
and management process. While minor software updates such as new driver packages and other bug fixes are typically 
unlikely to impact the TCB, more significant version increments and kernel changes—while infrequent—indeed may 
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necessitate an update to the whitelist and LCP. Today, managing between these disparate worlds requires a similar set 
of extra steps, tools, and processes, as described in the previous section on platform enablement. If customers  
are going to get the operational efficiencies of trusted computing use models that they increasingly expect, these gaps 
must be addressed.
While the operating systems and hypervisors are fairly well established in their ability to establish and manage 
basic trust on the platform, one could easily envision how native attestation capabilities could be an enhancement 
to the ability to manage trusted environments. For example, this function could be most useful in the management 
and update process because it would provide a mechanism for securely querying and verifying platform software 
versions. Perhaps more practically, merely having attestation services provided through the operating system or 
hypervisor would establish the functionality almost ubiquitously through many enterprise and cloud customers—and 
thereby unlocking the most valuable use models. Given the relatively limited technical benefits to adding attestation 
service natively into the base operating systems and hypervisors, this scenario seems unlikely to the authors, though 
integration into the management of these layers indeed seems to have both enhanced technical merit and more 
significant operational value.
Lastly, adding trust-based reporting and logging capabilities would be a natural extension of both the base 
environment functionality (i.e., software that is responsible for controlling the platform) and the new integral 
capabilities of this software (i.e., the ability to execute trusted launch). The decision for what trust-related 
management functions to integrate is likely to be determined as much by the function of how organizations overlay 
the roles of general IT management relative to those of security management personnel vs. pure technical merit. 
As a result, even where some number of customers will strongly opt for IT security staff to deal with most platform 
trust issues with specialized tools, it would still be reasonable to expect at least some incremental capabilities for 
reporting and logging trust for hypervisors and operating systems for use by IT staff. Given how integral a role 
trust will play in the hygiene of the overall compute environment, it seems assured that the software will evolve, 
including some level of reporting and logging infrastructure to reflect trust status and events such as successful 
or unsuccessful trusted launch; even if this is only to allow the generalist IT administrator to be more effective in 
maintaining a controlled environment.
Enablement at Management and Policy Layer
Enablement at the management and policy tools layer starts to unlock the higher value of the more advanced 
and more compelling use models—those of trusted pools and enabling compliance and audit capabilities. It is 
important to note here that we’re talking about a different level of policy and policy tools than the PO and PD 
policies in the TPM. Here we are talking about specialized security policy tools that allow the enterprise or cloud 
service providers to define rules, configuration options, and conditions that are approved and appropriate for 
their business operations and security posture. Quite frankly, the Intel TXT use models are not possible without 
the management and policy tools that define and control workloads in trusted pools. As one might imagine based 
on the structure of the pyramid in Figure 6-6, this layer and these tools necessarily follow the base platform and 
hypervisor and operating system layers.
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Even though there are indeed some platform dependencies (after all, one can’t build a trusted pool if one 
has no enabled servers or enabled operating system or hypervisors), there have been fast-moving, visionary, early 
enablers (such as HyTrust, Virtustream, and Trapezoid Digital Security Services) that have driven the crucial initial 
implementations and proof points on relatively immature platforms. In an interesting anecdote on risk-taking in this 
regard, the authors recall working with HyTrust in mid-2009 as they took on the task of working with prerelease 
Intel® Xeon® 5600 series platforms and VMware ESXi 4.1 hypervisor software to stage the very first trusted pools 
demonstration for the Intel Developer Forum. Of course, HyTrust, Intel TXT, and the hardware and software 
ecosystem have come a long way since then, but the foundational premise of trust-based control in the solution 
remains the same. Figure 6-7 shows a screen the administrator would see when implementing the current Intel 
TXT-enabled Hytrust solution to gain control over his virtual environment, enforcing trusted pools concepts that 
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Figure 6-6. Manageability and policy tools provide the functionality to form trusted systems into trusted compute pools
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Of course, there have also been those in the ecosystem that have needed to wait for more broad installed bases 
and customer demand before making enabling investments. But the market is seeing increased awareness and 
enablement on many fronts as these vendors see the power of these use models to enhance the security of enterprise 
and cloud environments, and to meet growing mandates for enhanced security.
There are two primary roles of these tools in our use models. These are to
 1. Consume the trust information—essentially helping to identify which platforms are 
trusted and which ones are not.
 2. Make use of this information to establish an enhanced security capability through policy 
definition and enforcement linked to the platform trust.
These two processes form the heart of any trusted compute pools use models. This is where platform trust 
information is surfaced and used to establish new control boundaries to better manage workloads. These totally 
new capabilities started captivating customer interest and generated momentum in the marketplace, especially 
in virtualized and cloud architectures where new controls are desired to replace the lost physical controls  
of the past.
While the initial implementations are compelling, strong and built with scale in mind due to their focus on cloud 
and virtualized implementations, it is natural to expect these to evolve as well. In keeping with past practice, let’s 
consider our standard set of value vectors for evolutionary enhancement:
Provisioning•	
The update process•	
Attestation and attestation services•	
Reporting and logging•	
Figure 6-7. HyTrust Appliance can control VM migrations based on host trust status
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Provisioning
It is unlikely that security policy management tools will provide any material enhancements to the trust provisioning 
process on an individual server or even a set of physical servers. But it is indeed quite likely that the virtualization 
and cloud management tools can provide better methods to deploy and control platform trust at scale. In fact, this 
is possibly the essential attribute for the cloud management tools as trusted clouds become a prevalent customer 
offering. Many cloud vendors are perhaps uniquely positioned to deliver on this enhancement as they typically 
craft many of their own tools (or even develop their own platform specifications or cloud software) for building and 
managing their cloud environments. As such, these vendors can implement the tools and technologies needed to 
solve their scale and operational efficiency challenges in a manner that the broad market may lag.
Updates
This same premise extends nicely to the overall management and update process. While the initial deployment of 
systems and trust is important, the ongoing management and maintenance is really the more significant hurdle. This 
is especially true for cloud service providers that require scale and operational efficiency for the profitability of their 
offerings. Having platform and software updating techniques that are more closely linked to launch and trust policy 
tools would be a major step in delivering better efficiency. Even the best in class of the early implementers would 
agree that they have much to do to enhance this aspect of their deployments today—it is still too manual to offer best 
operational efficiency. Similarly, security policy tools are still likely too loosely linked to the systems and software 
update processes to provide desired controls or efficiency for such processes. For this reason, most of the security 
policy and cloud management tools turn to attestation as an abstraction layer.
Attestation
The management and security policy layer is where attestation services, which were discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5, have been and will likely continue to be most widely implemented. To date, this has largely been driven 
by the natural fit between the role of attestation (identifying platform trust status) and the role of the products in this 
layer—consuming this information and making use of it to control platforms and workloads. There is nothing that 
leads the authors to believe that this trend will not continue—though this does not preclude that attestation services 
will be implemented elsewhere in enterprise and cloud deployments. The primary benefit of aligning with native 
attestation services is that this provides a relatively simple set of REST APIs for obtaining platform trust information 
on a broad scale.
Reporting and Logging
Reporting and logging functions will also have a similar fundamental value in the management and policy layer as 
they had in the base operating system and hypervisor layer. It is imperative that the management dashboards have 
at least some exposure to platform trust status to allow workloads to be managed, and to allow tenants of cloud 
environments (as an example) to see the status of their environment and to know when or if something unexpected 
has happened. Certainly, security policy tools must have the capability to report when the policies they define or 
enforce are broken because the underlying infrastructure is unsuitable (such as becoming untrusted). The initial 
implementations in the market from HyTrust, Virtustream, and Trapezoid provide such status, logging, and event 
service natively or through the ability to push this information through APIs, syslog exports, or to other tools (such 
as GRC and SIEM products) for display or remediation. Figure 6-8 provides an example of how the Trapezoid Trust 
Control Suite captures and displays platform trust data for IT administrators on a security dashboard.
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In such a view, an IT manager can readily see the trust status of various hosts in their infrastructure, and get 
access to more details about individual systems to identify where action should be taken.
Enablement at the Security Applications Layer
The security applications layer is comprised of some of the classes of traditional security applications focused on 
event reporting and managing compliance and risk. The main industry categories for these types of applications are 
generally SIEM or GRC tools, as shown in Figure 6-9—our now quite familiar ecosystem pyramid.
Figure 6-8. Server trust status can be aggregated, summarized, and graded on a security management dashboard
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Because the technologies and use models enabled by Intel TXT involve platform integrity, workload control, and 
policy enforcement, it makes perfect sense to have such applications aware and enabled to detect, report, and act 
upon the trust information available from the Intel TXT–enabled platforms.
Intel has been working with market leaders to articulate these use models and how to best reflect them in risk 
tools and information management tools. One of our earliest examples was a demonstration with RSA in 2010.  
RSA owns the Archer console, one of the market leaders for eGRC. In this instance, RSA scripted reports that enabled 
platform trust to be measured and reported into the Archer console. This provided a simple view of platform trust 
status on a pool of resources, as well as the ability to “drill down” into the specific trust attributes (including hash 
values of PCRs) of a platform. This last function would be useful in an audit scenario, for example. Intel and RSA have 
collaborated in subsequent years on further iterations of this rough example in demonstrations hosted at the US 
Government National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST).
As such, these tools are critical in enabling the last key use model (shown in Figure 6-2) mapping of technology 
layers to use models—those focused on enabling compliance to security mandates. These are the tools that business 
and cloud providers increasingly rely on to monitor and “prove” the protections they define for their workloads and 
infrastructures.
Similarly, Intel has been working with a number of SIEM vendors so that platform trust events can get logged and 
reported into the enterprise security management framework. Trapezoid was among the first vendors to demonstrate 
how to do this using McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) as an aggregation layer for platform trust status, then using 
ePO native interfaces or other APIs and data formats such as Common Event Format (CEF) to export the trust  
event data (for example, whether a platform trusted launch was successful or unsuccessful) into a number of  
market-leading SIEM products such as RSA NetWitness, Nitro Security NitroView, TripWire, and more.
Because these products serve such broad security missions, the authors deem it relatively unlikely that many 
will evolve significant specific capabilities to enhance platform trust use models in the near term—with better 
provisioning, updating, and attestation capabilities targeting trust. It is entirely natural to believe that these tools 
that are widely used for monitoring and managing security will become even more trust aware. This means that they 
should include the requisite APIs to gather (or at least take in) trust status information from platforms. It also stands 
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Figure 6-9. Integration with security and risk management tools helps integrate platform trust into security operations 
and compliance practices
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requirements for key workloads. The most helpful of these will also include mappings or references to the related 
“evidence” documentation of—or pointers to—the key standards and mandates that specify the protections and 
controls required by various institutional, industry, or governmental entities. This closes the compliance loop—stating 
the protection or control provided and the mandate or requirement that it satisfies.
The various use models for platform trust necessarily require that a complex, multilayered ecosystem would be 
needed—especially in the early stages of the market. Over time, one could probably predict with confidence that some 
of these layers and capabilities that are separate or independent today will likely merge or be consolidated in other 
layers. We have further suggested where some such evolutions of products and offering seem most logical and likely. 
This aggregation of functionality has a fairly well-established history in the IT marketplace. The only real questions 
remain in the details:
Which vendors will lead the charge?•	
Over what time periods will it occur?•	
Which capabilities or functions will be consolidated into which layers?•	
How does the consolidation lower costs, complexity, or otherwise improve the security or •	
operational efficiency of the use models?
The specific answers to these questions are difficult to predict, but the growing emphasis for companies to 
improve security for their datacenters and in the cloud provides very compelling motivation for players at all layers 
of the use model stack to look for ways to address risk, cost, complexity, and usability of security solutions for their 
customers. It opens opportunities for success for new entries into the marketplace. And as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, how ecosystems embrace and evolve trusted computing solution models and focus will provide differentiation 
and influence customers’ choice in platforms, software, cloud services, and other solutions. The growing early adoption 
of the use models outlined in this book will help provide the ecosystem with examples of how they can improve the IT 
manager and buyer experience for these solutions, and provide much of the catalyst for consolidation.
